02 mai 09
Thinking as a pure potency of actualisation
"The basic distinction here is between (1) the intellect becoming or acquiring an intelligible form and (2) a further actualisation of the intellect. It is this actualisation that enables the intellect to thing itself. It is this latter distinction that that constitutes thinking in the primary, definitional sense. The distinction between (1) et (2) is, we may recall, exactly the distinction Plato makes in Thaetetus between possessing and having knowledge." (p. 79 in Ancient Epistemology).
Now we understand what is the correct meaning of possessing and having knowledge, the fact, say, to be represented in a new account of a putative sentence (the first distinction doesn't match in a second intellectual framework, so in this case a sentence is always putative in a cognitive matter). But if we want to go on till now, the question then is why giving a new account of an antecedent propositional issue ? Is it only an improvement or simply a new face of substitutive satisfactions ?
Thinking is of course a pure potency of actualisation of something which has yet been thought. But nobody knows how and what. It is so always a recall. Martin Heidegger was one of the nowadays philosophers who had the insight of that in this times where everything appeal to think, we don't think yet. Because we never know when we think or believe what we know is truer than it was before.
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